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Consciousness
An Inner View of the Outer World
Right now my conscious experience is directed at part of the world. It
takes in some aspects of things around me and not others. Some bits of
the world occupy my attention, other worldly goings on condition or
colour the character of my current perceptual experience. I experience
buildings in view through the window, the clothes in the corner of the
room, the colour of the walls, the plate with breads, the coffee mugs,
the smell of fresh laundry, the muffled sounds of someone in the
kitchen, the sounds from the street: a sequence of things that in turn
capture my attention moment to moment. And all the while thoughts
occur to me, modulating my conscious awareness. I have no doubt
that the world and my place in it, together with my recent past history,
explains the particular form my consciousness takes right now. But
what shape does that explanation take? Things out there beyond the
boundaries of my skin enter into the conscious events I undergo. The
inner is in this way shaped and determined by those outer things that
impress themselves on the mind. What is it, though, for consciousness
of this kind to go on at all?
To say that consciousness is, in certain crucial respects, dependent
on the world and one’s place in it, is not enough to say all that needs to
be said about consciousness. There is a contribution I make to these
events, there are the inner aspects of consciousness. Right now I feel
the faint early signs of a headache, still off-shore but likely to take up
more and more of my attention. There is the awareness I have — not
always but there right now — that the things I see or hear are being
seen or heard by me at the moment. I know that they are there, that
they occur anyway whether I see or hear them at all. But no one else is
having this very experience of them. As I look at the corner of the
room, or out of the window at the buildings beyond, I am aware that no
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one else enjoys this view right now, this particular perspective on the
world. They could have done, or will do, perhaps, but right now they
are not enjoying what I currently experience: only I am presently see-
ing things from here. There is an awareness of the world from this
point of view and an awareness of my sole experience of enjoying it. I
am aware of my consciousness as a unique event, or it being mine.
Equally, I can tell that no one else is seeing the way the room looks
from the opposite corner. They could have been but they are not. A
chance for a certain conscious experience has not been taken by any-
one. No consciousness of the room from that perspective is being
enjoyed right now because there is no one there. There would have to
be someone standing in that place, awake and aware, attending to the
room and not lost in thought, for there to be such a conscious episode.
We know that occupying that space and being a certain kind of minded
animal, or brain active creature, is necessary for such a conscious epi-
sode to take place. Despite knowing this we seem to know nothing
else about what makes such a unique episode available to someone,
and appreciable by them for what it is.
Returning to my current experience, I am aware of the independent
existence of what I am seeing from my seeing of it: I am aware of the
transient nature of my conscious seeings. I stare momentarily at a
farmhouse through the window of a train and it then disappears from
sight. My experience is one thing: the briefly perceptible farmhouse
another. I can also interrupt my conscious awareness of the carriage
around me by closing my eyes.
There is also a certain range or reach to my consciousness: it
extends outwards and all around me (save perhaps for the space just at
the back of my head). It takes in certain things at a certain distance
from me. What lies outside my current conscious reach can only be
thought about, not heard or felt, smelled, touched or seen. Sometimes
the extent of my conscious reach expands when I attend to the noise of
the street or the distant sound of a taxi. Sometimes it contracts when
I’m lost in thought or pre-occupied with worries not related to the here
and now. The mind’s eye can turn inward and I can temporarily lose
my consciousness of the world. When ill or in a fever the world can
shrink to very local concerns with the body. Recovery is sometimes
signalled by noticing how far one’s conscious awareness now reaches.
The full extent of the world that occupies my attention when I am
awake and alert is what I call my cognitive surround. My current cog-
nitive surround is fairly extensive: it takes what is happening (heard)
in the next room. This cognitive environment (to borrow a term from
Sperber and Wilson [1986]) as created by my current conscious
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awareness centres on me and radiates out from this centre. It is a con-
sciously experienced world that is not solely located in my cranium: it
is not, nor does it feel like, the goings on in an internal, private realm.
Instead it is a way the world is presented to me right now and a way of
my being in the world. It is not shared with another, although we can
have overlapping cognitive environments, we can share aspects of our
conscious surroundings. Others can enter my immediate cognitive
environment by speaking to me and grabbing my attention. Their
words re-configure my experience in certain speech-directed ways. I
cannot but hear the sounds uttered as meaningful: as someone saying
such and such, and my experience is changed by what they say. The
conscious mind is very easily violated by others’ words: they get right
through to us, entering our minds uninvited.
This interplay between inner and outer, described above, shows the
way consciousness depends on both the subject’s physical and inter-
nal environment. The world and the people in it have a part to play in
shaping our consciousnesses. But the world is not enough. For it is not
just what we are aware of but also the fact of our being aware of it
(even our awareness of being aware), that we seek to explain.
Within conscious experience we can be aware of the difference
between what we experience and our having that experience. Con-
sciousness — or at any rate the consciousness human beings enjoy —
makes this difference immediately available to us for reflection, and it
is this feature that is characteristic of the consciousness we care about
and deem worthy of philosophical attention. And yet it is this feature
of consciousness that seems to go missing in Ted Honderich’s radi-
cally externalist account of consciousness.1
Despite offering a novel and usefully externalist perspective on
consciousness, as well as many important criticisms of other accounts,
Honderich’s own position doesn’t quite scratch the itch it creates. He
begins with a person seeing a page, and he asks what ‘exactly your
consciousness of the page’ consist in. (Actually, he asks ‘What did
your consciousness seem to consist in?’). We are told,
It was for the page to be there. What your consciousness seemed to
consist in was nothing other or more than that (p. 5).
But this is a very minimal account of a conscious experience — espe-
cially of one we have been invited to attend to. Is what it was like for
you to be conscious of the page really no more than Honderich says it
is? Although useful attempts are made to put it in other words, the
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[1] Honderich (2006). In this commentary all page references are to this target paper unless
stated otherwise.
doctrine of Radical Externalism about consciousness remains a little
elusive. Honderich goes on to say:
the state of affairs that was the page’s being there, a state of affairs out-
side your head, is one of the several most fundamental propositions of
the Radical Externalism that is our subject (p. 6).
By itself this is a sensible corrective to Cartesian individualism about
the mental: a welcome feature of Radical Externalism. But we need
more. Honderich seeks to oblige:
More fully, to be perceptually conscious is only for an extra-cranial
state of affairs to exist — for there to be a spatio-temporal set of things
with a dependence on another extra-cranial state of affairs and also on
what is in a particular cranium. The page’s being there, and more gener-
ally your world of perceptual consciousness is things being in space and
time, with such further properties as colour, and being dependent on a
scientific or noumenal world underneath and also dependent on you
neurally (p. 6).
And again:
The Radical Externalism being contemplated here in one of its three
parts is indeed the general proposition that what it is to be perceptually
conscious is for a world in a way to exist — i.e. for things to be in space
and time with certain properties and for them to have certain necessary
conditions (p. 7).
The key locution, and one Honderich has used in other writings to do a
lot of the work, is: ‘consciousness is for a world in a way to exist’.
What world? What way? Exist how? We need all of these questions
answered if we are to feel comfortable that Radical Externalism is
telling us something about conscious visual experience. For things to
be in space and time is for there to be real things, parts of the actual
world. But their existence is not enough for consciousness. Many
parts of the world right now exist with no one being conscious of
them. In some cases, the world we are conscious of, populated as it
seems to us with certain objects, does not exist in that way. (More of
that in a moment.) If the world (or the part of it) I am conscious of
exists, and therefore plays a role in my having the conscious experi-
ence I am now having, we can agree to that condition. But what else is
needed to get at my being conscious of my surroundings? It is not just
for that world, or that part of the world to exist — it is for it, in a way,
to exist. What way? Its existing in a way I am consciously aware of?
No. Honderich rightly criticises accounts that resort to talk of aware-
ness, or of things being perceptually available to me since they offer
no explanatory advance but merely presuppose the elusive
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phenomenon we are trying to explain. And yet, we will be obliged to
use these terms until we have enough insights from elsewhere, or
other terms, to enable us to see that we don’t need to make appeal to
them anymore and now do understand what those terms either presup-
pose or gesture at.
But we are far from there as things stand. The world, or the selective
perspective on it our conscious experience affords us, requires some-
thing to exist, but in what way that will make our consciousness of it
intelligible enough to dispense with talk of awareness or how things
appear to us? As far as Honderich’s focus on the world is concerned,
are we talking about the perceived world, or are we talking about the
perceiving of a world? Surely the topic of consciousness is mainly
concerned with the latter.
Let us now tackle the theme we passed over, that of consciousness
sometimes presenting a world of things that appear a certain way even
when those things do not exist. In somewhat Johnsonian fashion,
Honderich tries to defuse traditional objections to direct perception
theories based on illusion or hallucination. Here we have him saying:
Well, I myself can tell the difference between a state of affairs that is the
existence of ordinary things and a state of affairs that is the existence of
representations of ordinary things. In our lives as they are, there is a
good difference between representations, which can be in various ways
wrong, and ordinary things, which can’t. Seeing isn’t like dreaming —
seeing doesn’t seem to be like dreaming, which truth is unaffected by
your having to get out of the dream to know the fact (p. 7).
That may be, but of course some people can’t always tell the differ-
ence. The Nobel Prize winning mathematician, John Nash, like many
other schizophrenics reported lucid, stable and persisting hallucina-
tions of people confronting him and talking to him. It is clues from
something other than their conscious perceptions that tell them that
the people they see and talk to are not real. In Nash’s case he realised
that the daughter of the friend he repeatedly encountered was not get-
ting any older and so could not be real. He was unable to banish these
persisting hallucinated figures or to stop their words impinging on his
consciousness and altering his current experience. He even had to
check with others whether the people he apparently confronted were
really there. Schizophrenics will often tell you the imaginary people
they see are as real to them as you or I. The condition is so distressing
for the sufferers precisely because without neuro-pharmachological
help they cannot disabuse themselves of the existence of these imag-
ined friends or tormentors.
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These cases are more difficult to deal with than the usual cases of
hallucination invented by philosophers. Here, we are not dealing with
a dream world or simulation of reality produced by a brain in a vat.
The experiences these schizophrenic patients undergo involve per-
ceptions of their physical surroundings that really do exist and which
they successfully negotiate, where these perceived surroundings are
augmented by characters who do not actually exist. The conscious-
ness of such patients is a consciousness of a world but one they have
added to, and populated, with fictions of their conscious minds. Such
experiences can only be explained as episodes in consciousness and
talk of their being for a world in a way to exist may make sense, but
now the key phrase is being used in a quite different way when it is the
real world, or the world populated with imaginary objects, we are talk-
ing about. Consciousness is not always about existence and is not
always fully captured by what is out there.
Finally, we get to the nub of the problem for Radical Externalism:
subjectivity. Honderich tells us:
For Radical Externalism, perceptual consciousness consists in a state of
affairs that not only is partly dependent on one individual, but is also
different from related states of affairs dependent on other individuals. It
is also different from the state of affairs that is the perceived physical
world as well as other states of affairs that are in defined senses objec-
tive. If it is a near-physicalism, it does give clear sense to our conviction
about subjectivity (p.12).
I don’t agree. This statement tells us what subjectivity is not, but it
does not give to us a clear sense of what it is. We are told that con-
sciousness (with its essential subjectivity) depends on one individual.
We also know it involves a swathe of the world. Earlier we were told
that consciousness depends on that bit of the real world, perceived and
scientifically describable, and on what is in the cranium of the individ-
ual. We can agree to all of this, but what we urgently need to know is
what kind of dependence between these bits of the world produces the
easily recognisable subjective experience of an individual? What is
that dependence and how does it result in the states of mind we know
so well? As yet, we have nothing more to go on.
My response has been largely critical and sceptical of the account
Honderich offers us, and unlike Honderich I am offering nothing posi-
tive or new on the topic of consciousness, which remains one of the
most puzzling in philosophy. Conscious phenomena are so close to us
and so familiar and yet the nature of consciousness is so utterly inscru-
table. It is a brave philosopher who dares to propose an account of its
nature and attempts to satisfy our philosophical qualms that there is no
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account to be given. Ted Honderich has made such an attempt and
should be praised for doing so. He gives us all more material to get to
work on.2
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REPLY TO SMITH BY HONDERICH
Barry Smith’s direct, deft and instructive evocation of ordinary
experience at the beginning of his paper can take a Radical
Externalist aback for at least a while. Yes, it is all too true that some
bits of a room I am now in occupy my attention, are bits to which I
attend. Can it also be, as Smith says, that some goings-on, maybe
actions of another person, somehow condition or colour my current
perceptual experience? Certainly thoughts do come to me in the
course of my seeing the room. Indeed they are there more often
than not in the course of my seeing the room. Does it make sense
to say that they modulate my awareness?
You can wonder, as a Radical Externalist, whether or not your
wondering was the aim of Smith’s evocation of ordinary experi-
ence, if a world of perceptual consciousness contains more than
items that occupy the attention of the perceiver, items to which he
or she attends. The answer, on reflection, has to be yes. This fol-
lows from the fact, speaking ordinarily, that I do indeed see and oth-
erwise consciously perceive more than I attend to. The state of
affairs in which my perceptual consciousness consists must indeed
be all that of which, speaking ordinarily, I am conscious. Does that
proposition in itself raise further difficulty? Any such difficulty needs
to be produced.
The fact of attention is a further good reason for an admission
made before now (p. 00). The admission is that to speak of percep-
tual as against each of reflective and affective consciousness, or of
either of those against the other, is to make a forceful separation of
a process of which it may even be too simple to say that three cur-
rents in it affect one another and intermingle. What is attending to
something? Well, it seems persuasive to say that it is to think or feel
about one thing in particular of those you see. In which case, for
Radical Externalism and presumably other accounts of conscious-
ness, what we have a specific kind of eliding of perceptual and at
least reflective consciousness.
AN INNER VIEW OF THE OUTER WORLD 181
[2] My thanks to Ophelia Deroy for invaluable comments.
